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Less Would Be More!
Where the Ethical Intentions of Gregory and Rabinowitz are too good…
In their initial contributions to this controversy, Peter J. Rabinowitz (JLT 4:1,
2010) and Marshall W. Gregory (JLT 4:2, 2010) criticize the postmodern thesis
that ethical criticism is impossible, seeing in it a self-contradictory, self-defeating
overgeneralization. They challenge it with the thesis that ethical appraisal is un-
avoidable in the scholarly analysis of literature. For Gregory, the change in a person
that reading brings – which for him is always an ethical effect – is central. Rabi-
nowitz, on the other hand, postulates that reading implies (unavoidable) ›lateral‹
consequences on the plane of social relationships. Both cases, though, also involve
an overextended generalization, one that undermines the position of a ›new‹ ethical
criticism as much as it reinforces it. A convincing, rational explication of this eth-
ical criticism would need, by turning to various text-types and empirically deter-
mined reader-responses, to model not just the possibilities of ethical appraisal but
also its limits.
The point where Gregory and Rabinowitz are in complete agreement – as Ra-
binowitz himself explicitly mentions (2010, 159) – concerns the overextended re-
jection of ethical judgements in the scholarly analysis of literature in postmodern-
ism and post-structuralism. They argue against the thesis of these movements that
ethical judgements are (for a wide variety of reasons; see Gregory 2010, 274 ff.)
impossible (not least) in the study of literature and are thus not to be expected of it.
In principle, postmodernism takes issue with the traditional expectation that lit-
erature be evaluated ethically by referring to the meta-ethical bridge principle that
›should implies can‹. Gregory and Rabinowitz, though, believe that the justifica-
tion given for why it is a case of ›cannot‹ is a self-defeating generalization. In this
respect, Gregory discusses, among other things, the (post-structuralist) explana-
tion that everything is constructed and thus ethically relative – which is indeed
open to criticism as the generalization of a relativism that through that generaliza-
tion becomes a contradiction in itself and thus self-defeating (2010, 275 f. , 291 f.).
In my view, this criticism is entirely correct. Nonetheless, even at this stage, it must
be pointed out that it is not correct to argue in reverse and infer from the
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demonstration that ethical judgements can be made the (overgeneralizing) thesis
that they universally should be made (see below for details).
The point where Gregory and Rabinowitz take different paths concerns the jus-
tification for, and thus the way in which ethical judgements can (and should) be
developed in the scholarly analysis of literature. Almost always, the questions of
why and how coalesce in their studies; for reasons of space, I concentrate in
what follows on the methodological perspective of the ›how‹. Rabinowitz explicitly
describes his approach as a consideration of the »social«, »lateral dimension«
(2010, 159; emphasis in original) of reading that concentrates on the relationship
between the last two components of the triad of author/text, reading, and (social)
surroundings; Gregory, though, sticks to the better-established ›central‹ route, in
which the relationship between author/text and reader is fundamental (2010,
283 ff.). He sees the necessary new beginning for ethical criticism in the generation
of rational arguments for the ethical judgements that are made. In his view, tradi-
tional literary criticism fails for three reasons to meet this requirement (ibid.,
288 ff.): (1) only anecdotal evidence is provided (methodological confusion);
(2) lessons drawn (by an individual) are stated, but these are by no means neces-
sarily the only ones possible (intellectual confusion); and (3) the ›right‹ messages
that readers should draw from a text are stated normatively (ethical and rhetorical
confusion). These three (traditional) shortcomings coalesce in the concept of the
›lessons‹ (drawn by a critic) that tell readers how they are to ethically evaluate a text
but do not »ask or discuss with them, how they identify and evaluate the good and
bad influences in their lives« (ibid., 289).
His alternative model therefore treats texts as »invitations« to the reader, spe-
cifically in three dimensions: feeling, belief, and ethical judgement (ibid., 291).
The reader responds by interpreting the perspective represented in the text as a
possible »field of reference« – which is an ethical activity: »Assuming another per-
son’s field of reference, however, is an ethical activity because entering this alter-
native field of reference actually reconfigures our own« (ibid., 293 f. ; emphasis
in original). Through reading (as an acceptance of the »invitations« of the
text), the reader becomes a »different person« (ibid., 296; emphasis in original)
– and that cannot but indicate an ethical effect, independently of whether I
have become morally better or worse in character as a result (ibid., 298). In my
view, though, this model itself represents an (unnecessary) overgeneralization.
With regard to the role of the text, this applies to the three postulated dimensions
of invitation. There are certainly texts that imply a very strong ›ethical invitation‹
(e. g. Greek tragedy, as well as anti-war novels such as All Quiet on the Western
Front). Likewise, however, there also exist texts that determinedly avoid making
such an invitation – by doing without a positive or negative hero entirely (cf.
the theory of the nouveau roman and corresponding texts, such as Robbe-Grillet’s
Snapshots, which are concerned primarily with the revitalizing contemplative re-
newal of objective perception). In such texts, too, the »aesthetic tactics« that Greg-
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ory describes are out of place, for they all presuppose an object of identification
(ibid., 294 f.). This problem, though, is ›fixed‹ by an overextension of the concept
of ›ethos‹: if we look for an explicit definition of ›ethos‹, the first point of reference
that presents itself is (unfortunately) no more than a circular definition of ›ethical
influence‹, specifically »as any influence that exerts shaping pressure on one’s ethos, on
who we become as a result of bending with or internalizing that influence« (ibid., 297;
emphasis in original). From the remarks that contextualize the analysis of the
poem (one of which I quoted above), though, it is pretty obvious that any change
in a person is viewed as a ›change of personal ethos‹, even if it is only a matter of
expanding fields of perception, subsets of knowledge, and so on. This, though,
makes it entirely unclear what is not ethos: because every input necessarily changes
a person in some way, everything and anything is ethos, ultimately making the
concept vacuous as a result of this overextension.
The overextension of the concept of ›ethos‹ appears to offer an advantage, spe-
cifically that ethical criticism of literary texts (and their reception) becomes ines-
capable if it is adopted. But this unavoidability of ethical judgements, which Greg-
ory obviously sees as an advantage of his model, itself represents a source of self-
contradiction in it, for he thereby falls short of the stipulation cited above that it is
necessary to speak to readers in order to clarify what ethical effects are (or indeed
are not) to be found in their case. The content of the text, after all, is only an ›in-
vitation‹, a potential effect, from which it is not possible to determine (with cer-
tainty) how the text will affect actual readers: »No one can ever foresee exactly what
sense, meaning, or application of any literary content that any particular reader
may draw from any work, see in any work, or impose on any work« (ibid.,
288; emphasis in original). He lays claim to this very foresight, though, with
his thesis of the unavoidable ›change of personal ethos‹. In my view, Gregory allows
himself to be led astray here, by the overgeneralizing negative thesis of post-
structuralism that ethical criticism is impossible, to the opposite generalizing pos-
itive thesis that ethical criticism is unavoidable. This is completely unnecessary and
does not meet the need for rational argumentation that he himself called for in
order to progress beyond the traditional ethical standpoints as is necessary. To
annul the post-structuralist thesis of impossibility, it is entirely sufficient to
demonstrate that and when ethical criticism is possible and sensible. The justifi-
cation of ethical criticism becomes – to follow Popper – much stronger if it sub-
stantiates when such criticism is appropriate and when it is not, rather than allow-
ing itself to be infected by the virus of post-structuralist overgeneralization and
hopelessly overextending its own position. Less would clearly be very much
more here.
And the outline of this constructive ›less‹ is, in fact, in my view, laid out entirely
convincingly in Gregory’s model. On the side of the text, we can and should iden-
tify which texts do (or do not) contain an ›ethical invitation‹. And on the side of the
reader, we should indeed determine empirically how (more or less ethically) read-
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ers react to the proposition of the text. This does not mean making ourselves (com-
pletely) dependent on the scholarly analysis of reader-responses when practising
ethical criticism: we can certainly still criticize reader-responses as inappropriate
to the text (and that in both directions – as cases of unduly ethical or of unduly
non-ethical reception). That is to say: even if we take seriously Gregory’s original
methodological insistence that we should (systematically) observe reader-respons-
es, ethical criticism most certainly still has much terrain to survey – a broad field
that is not gained by an ethical criticism whose self-contradictory overgeneraliza-
tion of concepts brings with it a self-defeating assertion of universality.
According to Rabinowitz, the ›lateral‹ dimension certainly offers a fruitful path
for the systematic consideration of reader-responses. Rabinowitz too, though, tries
to establish this path as an unavoidable necessity in ethical criticism. For him, it is
unavoidable because aesthetic and ethical judgements are inseparable (in contrast
to the post-structuralist thesis that aesthetic judgements alone are possible, which
assumes that the two classes of judgement can be separated (Rabinowitz 2010,
159 f.)). He sets out the structure of his argument with exemplary clarity; it is
based on the following two premises: (1) »ethics […] involves relationships
among people […] in particular situations«, and (2) »reading is a social activity«
(ibid., 159; emphasis in original). It follows from this that literary criticism
must always include a consideration of the consequences of literary reception
in its social surroundings, and this means that ethical criticism constitutes an un-
avoidable subset of such literary criticism. If we accept the premises, the conclu-
sion is indeed unavoidable – but in this case, the overextension of the position lies
in the premises. Even the first premise could be criticized as (too) broad, but, for
the sake of simplicity, I shall treat it as appropriate in what follows. I do not find
myself able to do so with respect to the second premise, though. Here, in my view,
Rabinowitz turns the situation and his well-founded conceptual elaboration up to
this point on its head. For him, the scholarly interpretation of literature is a solitary
act in which concentrating on the aesthetic dimension (and thus evaluation) of a
literary work can be possible, while its direct reception always and unavoidably has
a social nature (and thus ethical implications; ibid., 160 f.). This classification is
incomprehensible from the perspective of the theory of scholarship, because the
scholarly interpretation (of literature), of all things, must under all circumstances
be designed around discussion with other experts in order that, in the consensus of
the knowledgeable, the validity of interpretive theses can be tested. In contrast, it is
the intimacy of what is initially only a personal, individual generation of meaning
that is much more likely to be associated with direct reception. The distinction
between the result and the consequences of an action in the analytic theory of ac-
tion can and should be considered here. The immediate aim (and result of the act)
of textual reception is the (re)construction of a textual meaning; changes (inside)
of a person (Gregory – see above) and effects involving communication with their
social surroundings (Rabinowitz’s ›lateral dimension‹) can then be considered as
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the effect or consequences of the meaning arrived at during reception. In German
work on teaching literature, these forms of ›lateral‹ communication with a peer
group or a (student) study group are subsumed under the heading Anschlusskom-
munikation (›adjoining communication‹), which thus identifies a competence that
for many is anything but a matter of course and must instead be acquired with a
greater or lesser amount of effort. For this reason, it should be recognized that
separating aesthetic and ethical evaluation is at least as clearly possible in the (di-
rect) reception of texts as it is in scholarly interpretations of literature. Certainly: at
any rate, it must be conceded that it is possible that a case of reception can operate
only on the dimension of aesthetic appraisal and not that of ethical appraisal. Ra-
binowitz’s thesis that we cannot separate aesthetic and ethical judgements must be
countered with »No, we can…!«
From this, though, it (again) in no way follows that we should therefore (always
and everywhere) do without ethical evaluation/s. Ethical criticism is neither always
and everywhere impossible (post-structuralism), nor is it always and everywhere
unavoidable (the ›new ethics‹ of Gregory and Rabinowitz). The overextended
claim to universality does ethical criticism more harm than good. We certainly
can and should undertake ethical evaluations by referring to the potential effects
of texts, be they primarily individual (Gregory’s ›central‹ dimension) or social ones
(Rabinowitz’s ›lateral‹ dimension), albeit – and this is the point – depending on
whether and how the potential effect of a text actually unfolds on the side of
the recipient. That, though, must be determined empirically, for here Gregory
is entirely correct in his criticism of traditional ethical criticism: the text has
only a potential effect from which it is not possible to determine (for sure) how
it will actually take effect on actual readers (see above). It is precisely this, though,
that both Gregory and Rabinowitz (again) draw conclusions about with their over-
extended thesis of universality, Gregory with respect to the ›unavoidable‹ change in
a person as a result of reading a text, Rabinowitz with the consequences of ›un-
avoidable lateral‹ communication. If we replace this unnecessary, unjustified, in-
coherent thesis of universality with the systematic empirical observation of (ethi-
cally relevant) textual effects, the justification for ethical criticism is reduced to that
core that can indeed convince in the form of the rational argumentation that Greg-
ory calls for. As mentioned above, this core represents such a broad field that there
can be no doubt that there is plenty for a ›new‹ ethical criticism to do. One variant,
for example, may lie in evaluating ethically by distinguishing between aesthetic
and ethical judgements. Only in this way, for example, can we explain that
many right-wing texts, because of the musical aesthetics of the songs that transmit
them, have a considerable attraction to certain young people and influence their
belief system.
In conclusion: a ›new‹ ethical criticism has a much, much stronger position if it
abandons the incoherent, overgeneralizing thesis that ethical evaluation is univer-
sally unavoidable and develops those areas in which ethical judgements are indeed
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rationally justified in the context of the scholarly analysis of literature. This jus-
tification should consider the different content (and thus the more or less ethical
potential effect) of texts just as much as the distinction between dimensions of tex-
tual effect (›central‹ or ›lateral‹) – and above all the systematic empirical observa-
tion of (ethically relevant) textual effects, in order to be able to undertake ethical
evaluations on the basis of them. So that there is no doubt, it must be emphasized
again that such reference to empirically observed textual effects does not define
scholarly ethical criticism. There can and will be cases in which it is precisely
the lack of an ethical response on the side of the reader that should be ethically
criticized. By the same token, though, the possibility that texts (in certain contexts
of reception) should be evaluated only aesthetically, not ethically, must be ac-
knowledged and elaborated theoretically and methodologically. A ›new‹ ethical
criticism will only be able to convince in rational terms when it also models
when and why an ethical evaluation is not appropriate.
Norbert Groeben
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